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I. INTRODUCTION
From its rather humble beginnings as a limited evidentiary presumption designed merely to shift the burden of proof in medical negligence actions and place the parties on an equal footing where a
health care provider had failed to keep statutorily required records,1

* B.A. 1973, Duke University; J.D. 1976, University of Miami School of Law; Associate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review. Partner at McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz &
Cartaya, P.A., of Miami, Florida.
1. See, e.g., Valcin v. Pub. Health Trust, 473 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), aff’d in
part, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
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the doctrine of spoliation2 of evidence in Florida has rapidly grown
into a separate cause of action. Although experience has clearly
shown the need for remedies to combat the spoliation of evidence under certain well-defined circumstances, the unchecked progression of
spoliation remedies potentially threatens litigants’ constitutional
rights to due process, trial by jury, and the lawful use of their property. A number of recent cases in Florida have appeared on their
faces to further expand this doctrine to situations where there is no
statutory, contractual, or other specific legal duty to preserve the
evidence, and where the destruction or loss occurs without intent, ill
will, or bad faith.3 Ironically, the California courts, which gave birth
to the spoliation principles in the mid-1980s, have now withdrawn
recognition of a separate cause of action after carefully reexamining
both its necessity and its effects.4
While early experience in this field has generally centered around
claims of spoliation of evidence asserted by plaintiffs, more recent decisions have applied its principles equally to defendants, particularly
in cases involving claims of defective or malfunctioning products.5
Therefore, both plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in ensuring that spoliation of evidence rules are not misused or misapplied by
the removal of the limitations and safeguards originally imposed by
the Florida Supreme Court,6 thereby resulting in an unintended abrogation of the fundamental constitutional rights of trial by jury and
due process of law.
II. ORIGINS OF FLORIDA’S SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE RULES
A. Early Cases
Although courts have traditionally had the power to punish parties who have violated their discovery orders,7 the origin of modern
spoliation of evidence principles in Florida dates back only to the
early 1980s. In DePuy, Inc. v. Eckes,8 the Third District Court of Appeal upheld the entry of a default judgment against a manufacturer
of a hip prosthesis that allegedly had failed. After the plaintiff
2. Practitioners and judges often spell the word incorrectly. Although “spoilation”
seems intuitively correct, it is spelled “spoliation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed.
1999).
3. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th. DCA
2001); St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sponco Mfg. v.
Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
4. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
5. See, e.g., Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co., 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also infra Part II.D.
6. Valcin, 473 So. 2d at 1305-06 (citing Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983)).
7. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.380.
8. 427 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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transferred the hip prosthesis to the manufacturer’s attorneys for inspection (pursuant to a court order directing them to preserve the
evidence intact), the defendant’s expert lost a critical portion of the
prosthesis.9
Because the plaintiff’s experts testified that they were unable to
render an opinion without actually inspecting the missing piece of
the prosthesis, the court concluded that the plaintiff had been irreparably prejudiced and entered an order of default. The order was
based on the provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.380(b)(2)(C), which provides:
(2) If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under rule 1.310(b)(6) or 1.320(a) to
testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of
this rule or rule 1.360, the court in which the action is pending
may make any of the following orders:
....
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts of them or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part of it, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.

In awarding these sanctions, the court further concluded that it was
irrelevant whether the prosthesis had been lost intentionally or accidentally, since the defendant’s loss of the device violated the trial
court’s order and resulted in irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff.10
B. Valcin and Bondu: Missing Records
The following year, the Third District dealt with another type of
“missing” evidence in Valcin v. Public Health Trust,11 which involved
a medical malpractice action against a county-owned hospital for the
alleged negligent performance of surgery. There, the surgeon failed to
prepare an operative note describing the surgery in question, despite
a statutory duty to maintain such a record. As a result of the absence
of the required record, the plaintiff’s experts testified that they were
unable to conclude whether the surgeon violated the appropriate
standard of care during the performance of the surgery. Accordingly,
the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.12
In an effort to level the playing field between the parties, the
Third District held that where a health care provider failed to pre9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
473 So. 2d 1297.
Id.

1292

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1289

pare or maintain a record required by statute or administrative rule,
thereby hindering the plaintiff’s ability to prove its case, the trial
court should utilize one of two evidentiary presumptions.13 If the failure on the health care provider’s part was intentional, the district
court held that this would create an irrebuttable presumption of the
defendant’s negligence.14 If, however, the failure was due to negligence or inadvertence, the court should instead use a rebuttable presumption of negligence.15
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court modified the rule set
down by the Third District, concluding that the use of an irrebuttable
presumption, even where the failure to keep or maintain the records
was intentional, would constitute a violation of the defendant’s right
to due process as well as an improper abrogation of the jury’s function.16 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the use of a rebuttable
presumption was not only constitutionally proper but also consistent
with the provisions of the Florida Evidence Code.17
For this rebuttable presumption to arise, the Supreme Court held
that the following conditions must first exist: (1) the health care provider must fail to prepare records required by statute or administrative code; (2) the absence of the records must prevent the plaintiff
from establishing a prima facie case; and (3) the information contained in the records must be peculiarly within the knowledge of the
health care provider.18 This is the only opinion to date rendered by
the Florida Supreme Court directly addressing the legal requirements for spoliation of evidence claims.
Shortly after its decision in Valcin, the Third District was once
again faced with the issue of “missing” hospital records in Bondu v.
Gurvich.19 Although this case involved a similar failure to prepare records required to be maintained by statute, it arrived at the court in
a much different procedural posture. Valcin involved the granting of
a motion for summary judgment in favor of the health care provider
based upon the inability of the plaintiff’s expert to render an opinion
on the issue of negligence due to the lost records. However, in Bondu,
the plaintiff had actually included two counts in her complaint seeking to recover damages for a cause of action based upon the spoliation of evidence.20 After these counts had been dismissed with preju-

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
Id.
Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987).
See FLA. STAT. § 90.302 (1985).
Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 599-600.
473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
Id. at 1310.
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dice, the plaintiff filed a separate action, once again asserting her
spoliation-based claims, which were also dismissed.21
In analyzing the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, a divided panel of the Third District concluded that the three
essential elements of any tort action were present: “(1) the existence
of a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a
certain standard of conduct . . . ; (2) a[n] [alleged] failure on the part
of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) an injury or damage to
the plaintiff proximately [resulting from] such failure.”22 The existence of a legal duty—in this case supplied by an administrative
regulation, coupled with a Florida Statute requiring the creation and
maintenance of the records—was emphasized by the court: “We recognize, of course, no such action can lie unless, in Prosser’s words, it
is ‘clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant[s],’ that is, there is a [legal]
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant which the law recognizes.”23 While noting that such a tort was “not a familiar one,”24 the
majority quoted Professor Prosser’s prior observation:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new
cause of action, where none has been recognized before . . . . The
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set.25

The majority also relied on the decisions of several California intermediate appellate courts, which had previously recognized a cause
of action based upon the spoliation of evidence involving nonparties.26
The Third District concluded that if such a cause of action existed
against a third party who had no connection to the lost prospective
litigation, then such an action should even more logically lie against
a defendant who stood to benefit by the fact that the “prospect of successful litigation against it has disappeared along with the crucial
evidence.”27
Chief Justice Schwartz, in an often cited dissent, argued against
the recognition of this new tort on the grounds that:

21. Id.
22. Id. at 1312.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
automobile dealer liable for subsequent destruction of van entrusted to it by plaintiff’s
counsel, thereby preventing suit against dealer for plaintiff’s personal injuries following
accident).
27. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312.
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[S]uch a rule runs counter to the basic principle that there is no
cognizable independent action for perjury, or for any improper
conduct even by a witness, much less by a party, in an existing
lawsuit. Were the rule otherwise, every case would be subject to
constant retrials in the guise of independent actions. Thus, what
the court characterizes . . . as an “a fortiori” situation is instead a
complete non-sequitur.28

Accordingly, Chief Justice Schwartz concluded that any action necessary to remedy a spoliation of evidence should be limited to the taking of appropriate remedial measures in the underlying main action,
to cases in which a judgment has already been entered in a Rule
1.540 motion, or to an action to set aside the judgment consistent
with the limitations inherent in such remedies.29
Despite the recognition of a separate cause of action for spoliation
of evidence in Bondu, Florida appellate decisions throughout the remainder of the 1980s largely relied upon the remedies provided by
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or the Florida Evidence Code to
deal with issues involving lost or missing evidence. Typical of these
cases was the Third District’s opinion in Rockwell International
Corp. v. Menzies.30 In Rockwell, the court upheld the striking of a
manufacturer’s pleadings and the entry of a default judgment
against the manufacturer in a products liability action, where the
manufacturer had inadvertently lost a portion of the product after it
had been turned over to it for inspection pursuant to a trial court order and a written agreement prohibiting its alteration or destruction.31 In upholding the sanctions, the Third District relied upon the
existence of the trial court order and a written agreement to find a
duty to preserve the evidence, so that the fact that it was lost made
the manufacturer’s lack of bad faith irrelevant.32
A resort to Rule 1.380 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was
also utilized in the highly unusual case of Hammer v. Rosenthal Jewelers Supply Corp.,33 which demonstrates the unpredictable situations in which spoliation of evidence principles can arise. In Hammer, the court held that the plaintiff’s lawsuit arising out of his alleged contraction of lung cancer could be dismissed as a sanction for
failure to comply with discovery where the decedent’s surviving wife
28. Id. at 1314 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Schwartz’s rationale subsequently
formed a substantial portion of the reasoning adopted by the California Supreme Court
fourteen years later in overruling the numerous California intermediate appellate decisions, which had continued to recognize the new tort of spoliation of evidence. See CedarsSinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
29. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1314.
30. 561 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
31. Id. at 679.
32. Id.
33. 558 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
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refused to give permission to the defendant to exhume her husband’s
body because of her religious objections.34 Despite the validity of the
objections, the Fourth District upheld the lower court’s action because of the defendant’s need to perform an autopsy in order to respond to the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence.35
C. The 1990s
After nearly a decade of dormancy following its recognition in Valcin, the cause of action for spoliation of evidence began to receive renewed attention in 1990. The Third District Court of Appeal was
faced with two suits seeking recovery against uninsured motorist
carriers that had lost damaged vehicles entrusted to them by their
insureds. The plaintiffs contended that the vehicles were necessary
to prosecute subsequent tort actions arising out of the underlying accidents.
In Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co.,36 the basis of the plaintiff’s
suit was an oral agreement by the uninsured motorist insurer to preserve the vehicle following the conclusion of the uninsured motorist
claim, so that the plaintiff could pursue a products liability suit
against its manufacturer for a claimed defect that had contributed to
causing the accident. As a result of the accidental destruction of the
vehicle, the plaintiff’s expert testified that while he “believed” a defect had caused the accident, he would be unable to actually testify at
trial on this issue because he had been deprived of the opportunity to
inspect the vehicle.37
The trial judge directed a verdict in the insurer’s favor on the
separate grounds that: (1) “Florida law does not recognize a cause of
action [for breach of contract] based on the denial of an opportunity
to prove a products liability case” and (2) because Florida products
liability law gives rise to a presumption that a product is defective
where it subsequently destroyed itself by a malfunction, the plaintiff
would be unable to establish that she had suffered irreparable harm
by the insurer’s actions in losing the vehicle.38 In reversing the trial
court’s action, the Third District quickly disposed of the second
ground of the lower court’s decision by noting that the presumption
of a defect only applies where the product destroys itself, not where it
is destroyed by a third party.39 The Third District next turned its attention to the more difficult issue of whether a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence could be based upon contract. First, the court
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 461.
Id.
573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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noted that a number of courts in other jurisdictions had recognized
such a cause of action based upon negligence where all of the traditional tort elements were present.40 Concluding that there was no legal difference between whether the duty to preserve the evidence
arose by contract or by operation of law, the Third District went on to
hold that there was therefore no reason to limit claims for spoliation
of evidence to tort actions.41
In reaching this conclusion, the Third District focused on the similarities between the duty to preserve evidence and whether the duty
arises in the tort or the contract context, while discounting the significance of the dissimilarities between each such remedy, particularly as they related to the issue of damages. The court noted that
damages in contract actions normally must be established within a
reasonable degree of certainty, which would be lacking where the
underlying personal injury action had not been finally disposed of
against the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court determined that an equitable exception to this doctrine would apply so as to impose any
risk of uncertainty upon the defendant, because he had created the
situation. Therefore, the court concluded that a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence could be maintained in either contract or tort,
as long as a duty to preserve the evidence existed.42
The second case, Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman,43 sought to
define the degree of “impairment” to the plaintiff’s underlying claim,
which was necessary to support such a cause of action, caused by the
destruction of the evidence. The damaged vehicle was entrusted to
the agents of the uninsured motorist carrier who, like the carrier’s
agents in Miller, inadvertently destroyed it. Despite the loss of the
vehicle, however, the plaintiff’s liability experts nevertheless were
able to testify in the underlying litigation based upon photographs of
the damage.44 As a result, the plaintiff prevailed at arbitration, receiving a $4.3 million damage award, which was reduced by her
eighty percent comparative negligence, to a net award of $860,000.45
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a suit for destruction of the car con40. Id. at 26; see also Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 454 (Alaska
1986); Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). As previously
noted, however, Smith recently was reversed in Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court,
954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
41. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27. A similar result was also subsequently reached in Brown
v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence was upheld against a city’s police department. The police department
had allegedly promised to retain a vehicle (purported to be involved in an accident with the
plaintiff) following the completion of its criminal investigation. However, the police department thereafter disposed of it, precluding the plaintiff from pursuing his case.
42. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27.
43. 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
44. Id. at 314.
45. Id.
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tending that her ability to present her uninsured motorist claim was
“hindered” by the absence of the vehicle itself, resulting in the high
comparative negligence finding. In this case, the jury found the
plaintiff “only” sixty-five percent at fault for causing the accident
based upon several evidentiary presumptions designed to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of her vehicle.46
In overturning the jury’s verdict, the Third District rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that she need only establish that she was “hindered” in presenting her case by the lost evidence. Instead, the court
held that the plaintiff must establish that she suffered “a significant
impairment” in her ability to prove her underlying case.47 On rehearing, the court further observed that while the question of whether an
impairment was “significant” was ordinarily a question of fact, in
light of the extent of the plaintiff’s recovery in her underlying arbitration, reasonable persons could not differ that there had been a
lack of a significant impairment in this particular case.48
D. Application to Defendants
The seeds for the application of spoliation of evidence principles to
defendants were sown in 1990 by the Fourth District in Hammer v.
Rosenthal Jewelers Supply Corp. In Hammer, the Fourth District
held that the plaintiff’s lawsuit for wrongful death could be dismissed as a sanction for the failure to comply with discovery unless
the decedent’s surviving wife gave permission to exhume the decedent’s body and to allow an autopsy.49
Nearly a decade later, the Third District removed any doubt that
spoliation of evidence principles would apply equally to the benefit of
defendants in DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co.50 The court also
reiterated the principle that the party’s intent was not critical, as it
expressly observed that the plaintiff had “inadvertently lost or misplaced” the critical evidence.51
Florida’s recognition of a defense based upon spoliation of evidence is consistent with the holdings in many jurisdictions, particularly in products liability actions where the allegedly defective prod-

46. Id. at 315. “The two presumptions the jury was instructed to apply were: (1) that
[the plaintiff’s] brakes failed prior to the accident, and (2) that [the plaintiff’s] vehicle
would have cleared the intersection [but for the uninsured vehicle’s] excessive speed.” Id.
at 315 n.1. The propriety of these presumptions was not challenged on appeal.
47. Id. at 315.
48. Id. at 316.
49. 558 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
50. 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762
So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
51. DeLong, 710 So. 2d at 707.
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uct is disposed of prior to suit.52 These cases generally have been
based upon the rationale that “products liability case[s] foc[us] on the
product itself,” and as such usually “involve competing expert testimony [for] juries [to] evaluate.”53
Courts have also expressed concern over the potential for fraud
inherent in these situations:
To permit claims of defective products where a purchaser of the
product has simply thrown it away after an accident, would both
encourage false claims and make legitimate defense of valid claims
more difficult. It would put a plaintiff (or plaintiff ’ s attorney) in
the position of deciding whether the availability of the item would
help or hurt his or her case. Where producing the product for defense inspection would weaken rather than strengthen a case, we
unfortunately are obliged to conclude that some plaintiffs and attorneys would be unable to resist the temptation to have the product disappear.54

As a result, where the defendant is unable to examine the allegedly
defective product, these cases have generally concluded that the defendant would be unduly prejudiced in having to defend against the
plaintiff’s claims.55
Although generally involved in products liability cases, the defense of spoliation has also been applied to a variety of other types of
cases as well, including medical malpractice,56 maritime,57 and
antitrust.58

52. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving
maritime case in which plaintiff’s expert conducted destructive testing on vessel’s engine);
Glover v. Bic Corp., 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993); Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660
(M.D. Pa. 1993) (dismissing suit under Pennsylvania law based upon an alleged defect in
truck owned by plaintiff’s employer where employer repaired allegedly defective part); Lee
v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (entering
summary judgment against plaintiff where counsel lost can of drain cleaner that allegedly
exploded and injured plaintiff, even where samples of contents had been provided to defendants for testing prior to loss of can); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D.
160 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (involving destruction of product by plaintiff’s expert); Headley v.
Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675
A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996); Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Stubli v. Big D
Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991); Roselli v. Gen. Elec. Co., 599 A.2d 685 (Pa.
1991) (entering summary judgment against plaintiff claiming injury by defective coffee carafe that exploded in her hand where fragments were thrown away).
53. Sipe, 837 F. Supp. at 661.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (involving destruction of body
in autopsy performed by plaintiff’s expert following exhumation of body for litigation purposes).
57. Vodusek, 71 F.3d 148.
58. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving an
antitrust action where plaintiff destroyed documents of allegedly illegal campaign contributions).
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Another case demonstrating the almost limitless potential for the
imaginative application of spoliation remedies is Vega v. CSCS International.59 In Vega, the defendant successfully argued in the trial
court that the plaintiff’s decision to undergo nonemergency surgery
to remove a herniated lumbar disc without first providing an opportunity to be examined by another doctor constituted spoliation of evidence—the evidence in this case consisting of the plaintiff’s lumbar
disc. Although the Third District subsequently reversed the trial
court’s application of spoliation principles, it held that the court
would have had the authority to sanction the plaintiff if the defendant had first filed a formal request for an independent medical examination under Rule 1.360 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Such a request, the court concluded, would have imposed a duty upon
the plaintiff to postpone the surgery in order to allow the examination to go forward.
As with claims advanced by plaintiffs, courts in different jurisdictions have applied spoliation principles in favor of defendants in a
variety of different ways. Some courts have dismissed plaintiff’s
claims60 or recognized spoliation as an affirmative defense entitling a
defendant to a verdict in its favor,61 while others have treated spoliation as merely giving rise to a presumption in the defendant’s favor.62
Still other courts have treated spoliation as a rule of evidence that is
not even required to be pleaded in advance of the trial.63 Some courts
have merely limited the proof that the plaintiff will be allowed to
produce in an effort to cure the prejudice caused by the missing evidence.64
Courts applying spoliation principles in favor of defendants have
also recognized differing rules for its application. Some courts have
required a showing of bad faith65 and others some degree of negligence.66 Still other courts have applied spoliation principles without
either bad faith or negligence.67
As with the recognition of a cause of action based upon spoliation
in favor of plaintiffs, the actual application of spoliation defenses has
59. 795 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
60. See, e.g., Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
61. See, e.g., Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660, 661 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Lee v.
Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
62. See, e.g., Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1173; Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 545 (W.D.
Okla. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1995).
64. See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991);
Barker, 85 F.R.D. at 545 (excluding plaintiff’s expert from testifying at trial where plaintiff’s expert conducted destructive testing of allegedly defective automobile parts).
65. See, e.g., Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., 471 S.E.2d 485 (Va. 1996).
66. See, e.g., Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
67. See, e.g., Vodusek 71 F.3d at 155-56.
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often been somewhat arbitrary and unnecessary. For example, some
courts have dismissed products liability cases based upon spoliation
even where the plaintiff’s claims relate to a design defect rather
than a manufacturing one, so that the absence of the specific product
would not be determinative to either party’s burden of proof.68
The determination of the parameters of the duty to retain a product or other potential evidence poses equally difficult practical problems in the application of spoliation principles to the actions of plaintiffs as it does to conduct by defendants. A good example of the scope
of these problems can been seen in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric
Tool Corp.,69 which involved a products liability suit against the
manufacturer of a circular saw for injuries sustained due to a purported design defect. The plaintiff claimed the defect allowed particles to improperly collect in the guard mechanism thereby preventing
it from working.
Following the incident, plaintiff’s counsel retained an expert in
order to determine why the accident occurred and if there was a
product defect. The expert was required to disassemble the saw, during which process particles trapped in the guard mechanism fell out.
The expert took photographs of the saw both before and after disassembly and then, after suit was filed, eventually forwarded the disassembled pieces to the manufacturer’s expert witness. Subsequently, the trial court struck the plaintiff’s expert witness for altering the evidence by allowing the trapped particles to fall out during
the inspection.70
In reversing the trial court’s sanctions, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that the expert did not destroy the product but merely
disassembled it in order to make the determination of whether the
plaintiff had a meritorious case in the first instance.71 Moreover, because of the nature of the defect, any handling of the saw as a practical matter would alter its condition to some degree. Therefore, the
court reasoned that the only way to have avoided any alteration of
the saw would have been for the plaintiff to identify all potential defendants to the controversy before suit was filed or an expert opinion
reached as to the cause of the accident, and to invite each such potential defendant to participate in the inspection of the saw.72
Because this would have placed the plaintiff in an impossible “Catch

68. See, e.g., Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa.
1992). But see Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994).
69. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 78.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 79.
72. Id. at 81.
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22” situation, the court concluded that application of spoliation principles was unwarranted.73
E. Claims Against Third Parties
The typical spoliation of evidence case based upon the actions of
third parties who are not actual litigants in the underlying litigation
generally involves experts,74 attorneys,75 insurance companies,76 employers,77 or other agents of the parties.78 Actions have also been recognized, however, against individuals and entities totally unrelated
to the pending litigation and parties.
In Brown v. City of Delray Beach,79 a cause of action was upheld
against a local police department for negligently disposing of evidence collected during its investigation into a hit and run accident,
where proof was presented that the plaintiff’s counsel had requested
access to the evidence while in the possession of the police. Despite
assurances from the department that the evidence would be preserved and subsequently made available following the completion of
their investigation, it was destroyed. In recognizing a claim for spoliation under these circumstances, the court focused on the existence
of a duty to preserve the evidence created by the express promise of
the police to maintain the evidence for the benefit of the plaintiff.80
In the absence of such an express promise, however, there is generally no duty to assist a plaintiff in investigating a potential claim.
As a result of the lack of such a duty, a spoliation claim asserted
against a ship owner by an alleged rape victim for failing to assist
her in the investigation of her incident was dismissed in Doe v. Celebrity Cruises.81
Another unusual application of the cause of action for spoliation
occurred in Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co.,82 in
73. Id. While it may have been impossible to determine the identity of all defendants
to the case, it certainly would have been possible to advise the manufacturer of the intent
to disassemble the saw and invite the manufacturer’s participation.
74. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
75. E.g., Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
76. E.g., Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. at 161; Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Vill. Pontiac GMC, Inc.,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
77. E.g., Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
78. E.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
79. 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal.
1983).
80. See Brown, 652 So. 2d at 1153.
81. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, (S.D. Fla. 2001). Doe can also be found at 2001 AMC 2672
(S.D. Fla. 2001). But see De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (permitting claim by passenger against bus driver for failure to obtain identity of truck causing collision).
82. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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which the plaintiff sued a building maintenance company for inadvertently throwing away bottle fragments left by his attorney in an
unmarked paper bag on his desk. Although recognizing that such a
cause of action could be stated under certain circumstances, the court
held that the maintenance company could not have been found negligent as a matter of law in this case, because the bag was unmarked
and appeared to be garbage.83 The real crux of the court’s holding,
however, appears more to reflect an unwillingness to extend the
cause of action for spoliation when dealing with unrelated third parties to the same lengths as when parties to the litigation are involved.
F. Insurance Coverage for Spoliation Claims
After initially concluding that insurance coverage existed for spoliation claims under liability policies, recent cases have taken diametrically opposed positions on this issue. In DiGiulio v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,84 the first Florida case to consider the issue, the Fourth District concluded that coverage existed
for a spoliation claim under a homeowner’s insurance policy. The
case began when a young child was injured in a boating accident. The
parents immediately retained an attorney, who secured an agreement from the boat owner to preserve the boat’s seat upon which the
child had been injured. After preserving the evidence for approximately one month, the boat owner subsequently sold his craft, mistakenly believing that the child’s attorney had inspected and photographed the boat.85
The parents subsequently sued the boat owner for spoliation of
evidence, seeking damages equal to those that they claimed they
would have received if the evidence had not been destroyed. After the
insurer denied coverage, the parents entered into a so-called
“Coblentz settlement”86 with the boat owner, pursuant to a settlement agreement between the parties, following which the boat owner
assigned to the parents all of his rights under his homeowner’s policy. Thereafter, the parents brought suit directly against the insurer
for the damages set forth in the settlement agreement.
83. Id. at 506.
84. 710 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
85. Id. at 4.
86. Such agreements are named after Coblentz v. Am. Surety Co., 416 F.2d 1059 (5th
Cir. 1969), in which the court upheld a judgment entered against an insurer based upon a
settlement between the insured and the plaintiff following the insurer’s improper denial of
coverage. The settlement provided that the judgment could only be satisfied against the insurer. In the absence of fraud or collusion, the court concluded that by denying coverage,
the insurer had waived any right to complain about the terms of the settlement. See also
Shook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Steil v. Fla. Physicians’ Ins.
Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
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The Fourth District reversed the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the insurer, concluding:
[A] prospective civil action . . . is a valuable “probable expectancy”
that the court must protect from interference . . . . We understand
the cause of action to be that the claimant had, as a result of the
insured’s undertaking to preserve the evidence to allow inspection
and photographing, an intangible and beneficial interest in the
preservation of the evidence. It is that beneficial interest that he
claims was lost when the insured negligently discarded the wooden
[seat] base. Thus it was not the insured’s own interest that was affected, but instead the claimant’s.87

Subsequently, in Norris v. Colony Insurance Co.,88 the Fourth District did an abrupt about-face by refusing to extend coverage under a
general commercial liability policy to a claim of spoliation based upon
a gas station’s erasure of a surveillance videotape in an underlying
assault and battery claim brought by a customer. The court distinguished its earlier DiGiulio opinion by concluding that it had never
addressed the issue of coverage in the first instance but only the applicability of policy exclusionary clauses.89
This time around, the Fourth District concluded that the spoliation claim was not based upon bodily injury but instead a destruction
of evidence. Although the purported destruction of evidence constituted a physical erasure of a videotape, the court further concluded
that it did not constitute a “physical injury to tangible property [of
the claimant] . . . [a]t best, the spoliation in this case had an effect
only on an intangible, plaintiff’s cause of action against her assailant.”90
After initially following Norris, the Third District reversed itself
on rehearing en banc in Lincoln Insurance Co. v. Home Emergency
Services, Inc.,91 in which an employee brought suit for his employer’s
alleged failure to preserve a defective ladder causing his injuries.
Noting that the policy recovered “damages because of ‘bodily injury,’”92 the Third District concluded that the claim for spoliation was

87. Digiulo, 710 So. 2d at 5 (emphasis added) (quoting St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)).
88. 760 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
89. Id. at 1012.
90. Id. (emphasis added) (holding that the physical damage to the insured’s property
(i.e., the videotapes) could not be considered because of a policy provision excluding coverage for damage to the insured’s property).
91. No. 3D99-1806, 2001 WL 37808 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 17, 2001), rev’d on rehearing,
2002 Fla. L. Weekly D513 (Fla. 3d DCA March 6, 2002) (en banc).
92. Id. at *4.
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properly viewed as arising “because of bodily injury” and therefore
fell within the policy’s terms or coverage.93
In an earlier decision, the Third District had previously refused to
extend liability insurance coverage arising out of a spoliation claim
caused by the insured’s intentional destruction of evidence in Scott
Technologies, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co. of Illinois.94 The court
concluded that the insured’s intentional conduct, which the trial
judge had characterized as “the most egregious case of discovery
abuse this Court has ever seen”95 and that had resulted in the entry
of a default judgment, constituted a violation of the policy’s cooperation clause.
G. Criminal Cases
Somewhat incongruously, criminal cases have been much more
restrictive in allowing spoliation of evidence claims, despite the
state’s significantly greater burdens to preserve and produce evidence than found in civil cases. For example, in State v. Erwin,96 the
court rejected the defendant’s spoliation of evidence claim in a DUI
manslaughter case where the police had used up one vial of blood
removed from the defendant and then accidentally destroyed a second one before the defense had an opportunity to test it. In reversing
the lower court’s suppression order, the Fifth District focused upon
the fact that because there is “no duty upon the state or its agents to
collect two vials for analysis,” the state could not be penalized for accidentally destroying the second vial, even if it possibly contained exculpatory evidence.97
III. THE TREND AWAY FROM REQUIRING A LEGAL DUTY
Although the early Florida spoliation cases made it clear that a
legal duty to preserve the evidence in question must exist, loose language in several subsequent Third and Fourth District opinions have
routinely been cited for the proposition that a duty to preserve evidence may arise merely because litigation is imminent or foreseeable.98 More recent decisions, however, have shown a marked diver93. Id. The court went on to find against the plaintiff, however, concluding that a policy exclusion for work-related injuries was also applicable.
94. 746 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). This decision was a continuation of the earlier case of Figgie Int’l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), discussed in
Part VII.
95. Scott Techs., Inc., 746 So. 2d at 1137 (quoting Figgie Int’l, Inc., 698 So. 2d at 564).
96. 686 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
97. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). As discussed infra, the court also relied upon the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which required the defendant to establish bad faith on the part of the state in destroying evidence.
98. Similar language is also found in a number of spoliation cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Wechsler 121 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D. Del. 2000); State Farm Fire & Cas.

2002]

SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

1305

gence between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on
this issue, with the Fourth District continuing to expand spoliation
remedies, while the Third District has begun to retreat from the implication in Sponco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alcover99 that a duty to
preserve evidence is created by the mere foreseeability of litigation.
In Alcover, the Third District upheld a spoliation of evidence claim
against a manufacturer who had discarded the allegedly defective
product (i.e., a ladder), despite the fact that there had been no statute, court order, or agreement requiring its retention. On its face, the
court’s opinion failed to enunciate its rationale, but has been read at
both the trial and appellate levels to imply the existence of a legal
duty to preserve the product merely by virtue of the fact that a lawsuit was imminent. This, of course, would represent a quantum leap
in the extension of spoliation of evidence principles by recognizing
the existence of a duty based solely upon the foreseeability of possible
litigation.
Such a leap came one step closer when the Fourth District subsequently relied upon Alcover in St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Brinson,100
to also uphold a spoliation of evidence suit without reference to the
existence of any statute, court order, or agreement requiring the product’s retention. Here the plaintiff’s decedent, a nineteen-month-old
child, died while under anesthesia at the defendant’s hospital. Subsequently, the hospital gave the anesthesia machine back to the
manufacturer in order to investigate whether it had malfunctioned,
following which the manufacturer disassembled it.
The decedent’s survivors thereafter sued both the hospital and the
anesthesiologist for medical negligence. After settling the case
against the anesthesiologist for $675,000, the plaintiffs filed a second, separate suit against the hospital for spoliation of evidence
based upon the hospital’s surrender of the anesthetic equipment to
its manufacturer and its subsequent disassembly.
Ultimately, the trial court consolidated the two actions against
the hospital, despite its argument that the consolidation placed it in
the “untenable position of being forced to choose between foregoing
the statutorily created privilege for risk management material . . . in
the underlying negligence action, or being prohibited from using information necessary to defend against the allegation of negligent spo-

Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747
P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); Viviano
v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
99. 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Compare Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), with Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
100. 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
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liation of evidence.”101 During the course of the trial, the court subsequently entered a default against the hospital based upon its refusal
to turn over various documents claimed to be privileged, following
which the jury returned a verdict of $8,325,000.
Although citing prior Florida cases permitting a cause of action for
negligent destruction of evidence, the Fourth District’s ensuing opinion is silent on its face as to the basis of the legal duty imposed upon
the hospital to preserve the evidence, which was held to be essential
in earlier cases in order to give rise to such a cause of action. In fact,
the court appeared to dispose of the duty issue by merely noting:
[T]he Brinsons alleged that because St. Mary’s knew of the potential civil claim against the vaporizer’s manufacturer, it had a duty
to preserve the vaporizer, and [St. Mary’s] failure to [maintain the
same] impaired the Brinsons’ ability to prove a cause of action
against the manufacturer and other responsible agents of the vaporizer unit.102

The court added that such claims are justified on the grounds that
“a prospective civil action . . . is a valuable ‘probable expectancy’ that
the court must protect from interference.”103 As with Alcover, the
Fourth District’s opinion on its face appears to imply the existence of
such a duty merely by virtue of the fact that the decedent died during
a surgery, thereby giving rise to the expectation that a lawsuit would
follow.
Nevertheless, a review of the underlying trial court records in
each of these cases clearly indicates that such an implied duty was
neither found nor relied upon by the trial court, which in each case
instead found the existence of such a duty in keeping with prior decisions. In Alcover, for example, the record in the trial court clearly established that the ladder in question was in fact disposed of years after the plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed.104 The trial court record further
indicates that following the accident in September 1990, the ladder
was turned over to its manufacturer, Sponco, by the plaintiff’s employer in December 1990. In August 1991, the plaintiff filed his
products liability suit against Sponco and several other codefendants. After suit was filed, Sponco’s counsel agreed to make the
ladder available for inspection; however, it later was learned that the
ladder was inadvertently disposed of sometime in 1993.105

101. Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
104. See Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 9, Sponco Mfg, Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d
629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (No. 94-02671).
105. Id.
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As a result of the disappearance of the ladder, the plaintiffs
moved for the entry of a default and other sanctions, supported by
the affidavit of an expert who stated that without the opportunity to
actually inspect the ladder, the “plaintiffs will be unable to either go
forward in establishing liability or to adequately respond to the defendants’ assertion of comparative negligence, assumption of the
risk, product alteration, or product abuse/misuse without this critical
piece of physical evidence . . . .”106 The expert’s affidavit went on to
further state that the available pictures of the ladder were insufficient to form a basis to render valid opinions regarding the ladder’s
design or manufacturing defects.107
The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion, specifically relying
upon the fact that the ladder had disappeared “after suit had been
filed,” thereby raising the court’s inherent power to sanction:
[A] party or litigant who, as here, breaches its duty to preserve
what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery
and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.108

Although not at all apparent from the Third District’s opinion, the
basis of the lower court’s ruling and the plaintiff’s argument on appeal were the provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.380(b)(2)(c)109 and the court’s “inherent power to regulate litigation,
preserve and protect the integrity of proceedings before it, and sanction parties for abusive practices.”110
While Florida courts had previously relied upon these authorities
to sanction parties even in the absence of the violation of a specific
court order,111 it is nevertheless clear that for these authorities to be
applicable there must at least be a pending lawsuit at the time of the
conduct in question. Therefore, although it is not at all apparent
from the loose wording of the opinion itself, when reviewing the underlying record it is clear that Alcover does not hold that a legal duty
to preserve evidence arises merely because the filing of a lawsuit is
foreseeable or imminent. Instead, Alcover is clearly limited to situa106. Affidavit of Vigil Flanigan, Ph.D., filed on August 4, 1994, in support of Alcover’s
Motion for Default and Sanctions.
107. Id.
108. Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 10, Sponco Mfg, Inc., 656 So. 2d 629 (quoting
from trial court’s written order granting motion for default filed on Oct. 17, 1994) (emphasis added).
109. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C) provides for the entry of “[a]n order striking out
pleadings or parts of them . . . or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part of it, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.”
110. Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 14, Sponco Mfg, Inc., 656 So. 2d 629 (quoting
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
111. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Pino, 482 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
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tions where the evidence is lost after suit is filed, resulting in a violation of Florida’s discovery rules or the court’s inherent power to control the litigation before it.112
The limited nature of the holding in Alcover was further verified
by the Third District’s more recent holding in Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,113 in
which the court expressly refused to recognize a “common law duty”
upon a defendant to preserve an allegedly defective piece of equipment in the absence of proof that the defendant had received formal
notice of the plaintiff’s intent to initiate litigation.114 In affirming the
lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
the Third District observed:
Unlike the defendant in Bondu v. Gurvich, the defendant in this
case was not under any statutory or contractual duty to maintain
or preserve the transformer in question. To the extent that the appellant, who was the plaintiff below, argues that the defendant
was under some type of common law duty to preserve the transformer in question after being notified of possible legal action
against the defendant in connection with the transformer, we note
that the record refutes the plaintiff ’ s contention that the defendant’s legal department was notified both by a letter and a “fax”
concerning the possible initiation of legal action and, therefore,
should have preserved the transformer as potential evidence in
that legal action.115

Although the Third District did not definitely answer the question of
whether a common law duty could arise under any set of circumstances, it nevertheless made it clear that at the very least, such a
duty would require sufficient proof of the receipt of formal notice of
an intent to initiate litigation.

112. In Alcover, the Third District made it clear that it was not proceeding under the
same rules that would be applicable to a pure spoliation of evidence cause of action. 656 So.
2d at 630 n.1. In fact, the court’s note clearly implies that the requirements for stating a
cause of action for spoliation would be more strenuous, by noting “[u]nder certain circumstances, the destruction of evidence may confer in an aggrieved party a separate cognizable
claim.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The clear implication is that such circumstances did not exist in the present case.
113. 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
114. The Third District’s retraction from Alcover is further evidenced by its even more
recent decision in Vega v. CSCS International, 795 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), in which
it held that in the absence of a formal request for an independent medical examination under Rule 1.360, a plaintiff could not be guilty of spoliation by proceeding with surgery to
remove a lumbar disc without first undergoing an examination by a second physician. The
court concluded, however, that a formal request under Rule 1.360 would create a duty for
the plaintiff to undergo such an examination before proceeding with the surgery.
115. Pa. Lumberman’s Mutual Ins. Co., 724 So. 2d at 630 (citations omitted); see also
Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that mere
disassembly of a product in the absence of a court order or improper motive does not justify
spoliation sanctions).
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A close inspection of the lower court record underlying Brinson116
also clearly indicates that the claims of spoliation by the plaintiffs at
trial were not based upon any implied common law duty arising because of the foreseeability of possible litigation. Instead, it was argued at both the trial and appellate levels117 that the hospital had a
duty to preserve the anesthesia equipment intact by virtue of either
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act [“FDA”],118 section 395.0197, Florida Statutes,119 or Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.222.120 Although there is a serious issue as to whether any of these statutes or
rules provides a sufficient basis for a duty to preserve evidence,121 it
is nevertheless clear that both the plaintiffs and the trial court were
proceeding forward on the theory that the hospital violated a statutory or administrative duty to retain the equipment intact and not on
116. 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
117. See Respondent Brinson’s Brief on the Merits at 31-39, St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v.
Brinson, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (No. 89,889); Petitioner St. Mary’s Hospital’s
Initial Brief on the Merits at 34-40, St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla.
3d DCA 1995) (No. 94-2130).
118. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b) (2000). This statute provides:
(b)
User reports
(1)(A) Whenever a device user facility receives or otherwise becomes aware of
information that reasonably suggests that a device has or may have caused or
contributed to the death of a patient of the facility, the facility shall, as soon as
practicable but not later than 10 working days after becoming aware of the information, report the information to the Secretary and, if the identity of the
manufacturer is known, to the manufacturer of the device . . . .
(B)
Whenever a device user facility receives or otherwise becomes aware
of—
(i)
information that reasonably suggests that a device has or may have
caused or contributed to the serious illness of, or serious injury to, a patient of
the facility, or
(ii)
other significant adverse device experiences as determined by the Secretary by regulation to be necessary to be reported, the facility shall, as soon as
practicable but not later than 10 working days after becoming aware of the information, report the information to the manufacturer of the device or to the
Secretary if the identity of the manufacturer is not known.
119. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (2001) provides in pertinent part:
(6)(a) Each licensed facility subject to this section shall submit an annual
report to the agency summarizing the incident reports that have been filed in
the facility for that year.
....
(7)
The licensed facility shall notify the agency no later than 1 business
day after the risk manager or his or her designee has received a report pursuant to paragraph (1)(d) and can determine within 1 business day that any of
the following adverse incidents has occurred . . . .
120. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 59A-3.222 provides in pertinent part:
(1)
Each hospital shall develop, implement, and maintain a written preventive maintenance plan, in conjunction with the policies and procedures developed by the infection control committee, to ensure that the facility is maintained in accordance with the following:
....
(b)
All patient care equipment shall be maintained in a clean, properly
calibrated, and safe operating condition; . . . .
121. See infra Part VII.B.2 (discussing Statutory and Administrative Duties).
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some common law duty based upon the foreseeability of future litigation.
Recently, the Fourth District further expanded upon Brinson in
Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,122 which recognized the existence of a duty to preserve evidence simply by virtue of the preparation of a work product incident report. Hagopian was injured while
shopping in a Publix store in April of 1991 by a bottle that either exploded or fell off of a shelf. The store manager filled out an accident
report and saved the bottle fragments, along with the other bottles
from the same six-pack.
In July of 1991, plaintiff’s attorney wrote to Publix to put it on
notice of Ms. Hagopian’s claim; however, no request was made to inspect the bottle fragments. Several months later the Publix store
where the accident occurred was closed down and the bag with the
fragments was not preserved.
While suit was eventually filed in 1994, the first request to inspect
the bottle by the plaintiff was not made until 1997, some six years after the accident. Although recognizing that the fragments had been
destroyed incidentally and prior to the initiation of suit, the Fourth
District nevertheless concluded that the preparation of the incident
report, coupled with Publix’s refusal to produce it on work product
grounds, evidenced that it anticipated litigation, thereby creating a
duty to preserve the potential evidence.
The further extension of Alcover and Brinson by Hagopian can
hardly be deemed insignificant, because the existence of a legally
recognized duty is the cornerstone of tort law.123 Even under contract
theories there must be a legal duty arising either as the result of an
express or implied agreement. Thus, if the opinions in these cases are
used to support the creation of such a duty merely by virtue of the

122. 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
123. The scope of Brinson was originally also cast into doubt by the Fourth District’s
subsequent decision in Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Without reference to Brinson, the court concluded that a duty to preserve documents arose
by virtue of a discovery request seeking such documents in a pending lawsuit. Although
not expressly rejecting the contention that such a duty can arise prior to the filing of the
lawsuit, this was the clear implication of the court’s ruling:
Appellants claim that because there was no lawful duty on their part to preserve the evidence, the claim should never have gone to the jury. While we
agree that Appellants were under no statutory or contractual duty to maintain
such evidence, a party does have an affirmative responsibility to preserve any
items or documents that are the subject of a duly served discovery request.
(“[T]he duty of a litigant to preserve relevant evidence is established by the opposing party’s submission of a discovery request identifying documents of the
same subject matter as those which the receiving party possesses . . . .”).
Id. at 1093-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, in light of its even more
recent Hagopian decision, it appears the Fourth District did not intend to limit Brinson in
this manner.
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fact that an accident occurred, so that a lawsuit (just like Mary’s
lamb) was sure to follow, the practical and legal ramifications of such
decisions are extremely troubling.
Does this mean that every time there is an accident that involves
some instrumentality, product, or condition, the owner or possessor
must preserve it intact until a lawsuit is filed, sometimes years later,
so that all of the attorneys and their experts can examine it? Would a
landowner be guilty of spoliation of evidence simply because he fills
in a hole on his premises that someone tripped in to make his property safer? Are the drivers of two cars that collide guilty of spoliation
of evidence because they move their cars off of the busy highway or
because they subsequently repair their cars? Is a store owner guilty
of destroying evidence because he cleans up a spill in which a patron
fell or because he retiles the floor to make it safer?124 Is an electric
utility guilty of spoliation every time it repairs a generator that
caused a power outage, as claimed in Pennsylvania Lumberman’s
Mutual Insurance Co.?125 An affirmative answer to any of these questions does not require much of an extension of Brinson, Alcover, and
Hagopian.126
IV. FEDERAL TREATMENT
The threshold question faced by federal courts is whether the spoliation issues are to be decided by the substantive law of the forum
state or by federal evidentiary or procedural law. As typical, there is
authority supporting both points of view.127
124. See also examples posed in Bard D. Rockenbach, Spolitation of Evidence: A Double-Edged Sword, 75 FLA. BAR J. 34 (2001).
125. 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). As observed by Florida Power & Light in its
brief:
Such a requirement would cripple FPL by requiring it to retain thousands upon
thousands of useless transformers for years. While this may, at first blush appear alarmist, the court will agree that every power outage raises the potential
for litigation—everything from computer related problems to elevator entrapment. The plaintiff’s proposal would require Florida Power and Light to keep
every failed transformer at least until the statute of limitations expires in four
years.
Answer Brief of Appellee Florida Power & Light Co. at 12-13, Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (No. 98-01290).
126. These situations are not at all far-fetched. The author has previously defended a
lawsuit in which a cruise ship passenger claimed to have been injured on a chair that allegedly broke. After the passenger advised the Staff Captain that he was not injured in the
accident, the chair was discarded or repaired. One year later the passenger sued the cruise
line for injuries alleged to have been sustained from the collapsing chair. Two years after
the suit was initially filed, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to assert a cause of
action for spoliation of evidence. See Schulmann v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 9724239 CA 01 (27) (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. 1999).
127. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994) (and cases referred to therein); see also Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass.
1991).
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Federal courts have generally looked to either their inherent
power to regulate litigation or the authority granted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction discovery abuses as their source
of authority in fashioning spoliation remedies.128 Generally these
remedies have taken the form of adverse inferences129 or the exclusion of expert testimony.130 Federal courts have also generally differed as to whether bad faith is a prerequisite for the imposition of
spoliation remedies.131
The Eleventh Circuit treats spoliation of evidence claims through
the use of adverse inferences; however, this requires a showing of
bad faith.132 “‘Mere negligence’ in losing or destroying the records is
not enough for an adverse inference, as ‘it does not sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case.’”133 Accordingly, in Bashir, the
Eleventh Circuit held that in the absence of bad faith amounting to
evidence tampering, the railroad’s failure to preserve a speed recorder tape would not give rise to an adverse inference, even though
it was central to the plaintiff’s case, which was based upon the claim
that the train had been traveling at an excessive rate of speed.134
Surprisingly, although the Eleventh Circuit required bad faith to
obtain an adverse inference in the case of spoliation, it required only
a showing of negligence as a predicate to obtaining discovery sanctions in Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.135 for the incidental destruction of documents. The court predicated an award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) because the
defendant did not promptly admit that the requested documents had
been destroyed, requiring the plaintiff to expend attorney’s fees in
litigating the discoverability of the nonexistent documents.

128. See Banco Latino, S.A.C.A. v. Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (and
cases cited therein).
129. See, e.g., Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997); Vodusek v. Bayliner
Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995); Vick v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 514 F.2d 734
(5th Cir. 1975).
130. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1992).
131. Compare Bashir, 119 F.3d at 932 (requiring bad faith), with Vodusek, 71 F.3d 148,
and Glover v. Bic Corp., 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a showing of bad faith is
not required).
132. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931; Vick, 514 F.2d at 737. Vick was adopted as binding
precedent by virtue of Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
133. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931 (citations omitted) (quoting Vick).
134. Id. at 932.
135. 125 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1997).
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V. THE NEED TO REDEFINE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE REMEDIES
IN FLORIDA
A. Constitutional Limitations
Although Valcin has often been cited as authority for the more recent spoliation of evidence opinions, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was extremely limited in nature and not intended to be given
the broad scope that some of these more recent decisions have attributed to it. Perhaps even more importantly, in Valcin the supreme
court reversed the district court of appeal’s adoption of an irrebuttable presumption of negligence on constitutional grounds, even
though it was limited to situations where the failure to create or
maintain records was both intentional and required by statute.
It is hard to rationalize how the entry of a default judgment or the
striking of a party’s pleadings is any less of an abridgement upon
that party’s right to due process or trial by jury than the use of the
irrebuttable presumption rejected in Valcin. In each case the result
is the same. Instead, the court in Valcin utilized the least drastic
remedy possible in an effort to remedy the required abuse, while at
the same time preserving both parties’ right to due process and trial
by jury. In so doing, the supreme court further made it clear that
even this narrow remedy was to be given a very restricted application, stating “We first stress the limited function of the presumption.
. . . The presumption, shifting the burden of producing the evidence,
is given life only to equalize the parties’ respective positions in regard to the evidence and to allow the plaintiff to proceed.”136
Therefore, to fill the need for such a remedy while at the same
time making a workable and practicable solution that does not impair the parties’ constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury,
the further development of the principle of spoliation of evidence
must not lose sight of the remedy’s limited nature as well as its potential to do considerable constitutional mischief.
B. California’s About-Face
The nationwide expansion of spoliation remedies received a serious setback in 1998, when the California Supreme Court in CedarsSinai Medical Center v. Superior Court refused to recognize the tort
created by one of its immediate appellate courts fourteen years earlier.137 In a medical malpractice case against a hospital arising from
birth-related injuries, the California Supreme Court reversed a long
line of prior decisions by intermediate appellate courts recognizing a
tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence. The court concluded:
136. Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599-600 (Fla. 1987).
137. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
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The intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to the
cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation. There
are, however, existing and effective nontort remedies for this problem. Moreover, a tort remedy would impose a number of undesirable social costs, as well as running counter to important policies
against creating tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct.138

The court began its analysis by first addressing the issue of duty.
After noting that all torts involve a violation of a legal duty “imposed
by statute, contract or otherwise,”139 it then went on to further observe that: “the concept of duty ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.’ It is ‘only an expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’”140
The court thereafter turned to the policy considerations giving
rise to the need for a tort remedy to address spoliation:
No one doubts that the intentional destruction of evidence should
be condemned. Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits
of the underlying cause of action. Destroying evidence can also increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the
destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less
accessible, less persuasive, or both.
That alone, however, is not enough to justify creating tort liability for such conduct. We must also determine whether a tort remedy for the intentional first party spoliation of evidence would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing
remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens
it would impose. Three concerns in particular stand out here: the
conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation
and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies
for spoliation; and the uncertainty of the fact of harm in spoliation
cases.141

As with Chief Judge Schwartz’s dissent in Valcin, the court placed
great reliance upon the common law’s long history of limiting remedies for litigation-related misconduct to sanctions within the underlying lawsuit, rather than by creating new derivative actions. Relying
upon the need for finality to litigation, the court observed that California law did not allow separate causes of action for perjury, concealing or withholding evidence, or the presentation of false evidence,
despite the obvious grievous nature of such offenses. Accordingly, the
court concluded: “‘Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever fi138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515 (citations omitted).
Id.
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nally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of
justice . . . .’”142
The court’s analysis next turned to the availability of alternative
nontort remedies already in existence to remedy spoliation. Foremost
among these remedies is the existence of an evidentiary inference,
which can be tailored to remedy the specific facts of the spoliation involved in a particular case. Other remedies include the full range of
sanctions typically permitted for discovery abuses, including fines,
contempt, the establishment of particular designated facts, the striking of specific claims or defenses, disciplinary sanctions against attorneys, and even criminal penalties. The court concluded that the
wide range of alternative remedies available was clearly sufficient to
remedy spoliation of evidence without resort to an independent tort.
The next stage of the court’s analysis focused upon the lack of certainty associated with the damage claims inherent in spoliation actions. In such cases, the court concluded:
[E]ven if the jury infers from the act of spoliation that the
spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator,
there will typically be no way of telling what precisely the evidence
would have shown and how much it would have weighed in the
spoliation victim’s favor. Without knowing the content and weight
of the spoliated evidence, it would be impossible for the jury to
meaningfully assess what role the missing evidence would have
played in the determination of the underlying action. The jury
could only speculate as to what the nature of the spoliated evidence was and what effect it might have had on the outcome of the
underlying litigation.143

After concluding that the problems inherent in a tort remedy for
spoliation of evidence outweighed the value for such a cause of action, the court looked to the indirect effects that such cause of action
might produce. At the top of the list were the immeasurable expenses
that society as a whole would incur as businesses and individuals
were required “to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an indefinite period documents and things of no apparent value solely to
avoid the possibility of spoliation liability if years later those items
turn out to have some potential relevance to future litigation.”144
The court also looked to the costs of litigating what it termed
“meritless spoliation actions,”145 where the potentially relevant evidence no longer existed because it had been discarded or misplaced
in the ordinary course of events rather than for any ulterior purpose.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.
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“Many corporations and other entities, for example, have document
retention policies under which they destroy at stated intervals documents for which they anticipate having no further need. The mere
fact of destruction, however, would permit a disappointed litigant to
sue the prevailing party for spoliation . . . .”146
Finally, the court weighed the practical difficulties in trying a spoliation tort cause of action jointly with the claims in the underlying
action. At the very least, the court concluded that such a joinder of
claims would create a very significant potential for jury confusion
and inconsistencies of results.147
On the other hand, requiring the spoliation remedy to proceed
separately from the underlying action:
[W]ould result in duplicative proceedings without avoiding the potential for inconsistent results. The spoliation action would require
a “retrial within a trial” for all of the evidence in the underlying
action would have to be presented again so that the spoliation jury
could determine what effect the spoliated evidence would have had
in light of all of the other evidence.148

As a result of its analysis, the court concluded that while the intentional spoliation of evidence is “an unqualified wrong,”149 that it
was:
[T]he rare case in which a tort remedy for an intentionally caused
harm is not appropriate. The remedies already available in first
party spoliation cases to the spoliation victim, especially the evidentiary inference provided by Evidence Code section 413 and the
discovery remedies of Code of Civil Procedure section 2023, provide
a substantial deterrent to acts of spoliation, and substantial protection to the spoliation victim. Given that existing remedies will
in most cases be effective at ensuring that the issues in the underlying litigation are fairly decided, whatever incremental additional
benefits a tort remedy might create are outweighed by the policy
considerations and costs described above.150

VI. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES
Most states now recognize some form of a spoliation of evidence
remedy,151 although a number still do not allow a separate cause of
146. Id. at 519-20 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 520.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 521.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Levinson v. Citizens Nat’l Bank,
644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M.
1995); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993).

2002]

SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

1317

action.152 Those states that do permit spoliation claims generally recognize the necessity for the existence of a duty to preserve the evidence in the first instance; however, they have defined the duty in a
variety of different manners.
Indiana, for instance, which refers to its tort as intentional interference with civil litigation, limits its application to the following
situations: where there exists “an independent tort, contract, agreement, or special relationship imposing a duty to the particular claimant.”153 The Kansas Supreme Court, which adopted a similar standard, stated:
Appellant readily concedes in his brief that “no jurisdiction has
recognized a general common-law duty to preserve evidence” and
that “under the present case law, [defendant] has no articulated
common-law duty to preserve [plaintiff ’ s ] evidence.” It is fundamental that before there can be any recovery in tort there must be
a violation of a duty owed by one party to the person seeking recovery.154

Several states, however, have concluded that a duty to preserve
evidence arises where there is “[p]ending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff” and “knowledge on the part of defendant that
litigation exists or is probable.”155 Some of the factors which courts
have looked at to determine whether a party has sufficient notice of
pending litigation are whether it has performed a formal investigation156 or retained its own experts.157 Other states follow different
rules for defining the duty to preserve evidence whether the spoliation is alleged to be intentional or merely negligent.158
152. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 163 (D. Col. 1994) (recognizing spoliation remedy as a rule of evidence rather than a claim for relief); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996) (inference only is allowed); Federated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990) (concluding sufficient remedies exist under Minnesota law without creating a new tort); Brown v. Hamid,
856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (refusing to follow Bondu’s rationale in allowing a
claim against a doctor for failing to keep medical records); Proske v. St. Barnabus Med.
Ctr., 712 A.2d 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). In Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429,
432 (Ala. 2000), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it was not recognizing a new
cause of action because a claim for negligent spoliation could be “stated under existing
negligence law without creating a new tort.”
153. Levinson, 644 N.E.2d at 1268.
154. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987).
155. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1038; see also State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991); Fire Ins. Exch.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987) (involving situation where party is on notice of potential litigation); Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1993); Viviano, 597 A.2d 543.
156. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. at 163; Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d at 914.
157. Id.
158. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (following the Indiana
rule for intentional claims and the Ohio rule for claims based upon negligence).
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VII. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
A. Is a Separate Cause of Action Merited?
The Florida Supreme Court has yet to expressly recognize a separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence. As with California, the
remedy was first developed by the state’s intermediate appellate
courts. The obvious question that arises is whether the Florida experience will mirror the California one once the Florida Supreme
Court finally weighs in on this issue.
The arguments against recognizing a separate cause of action are
thoroughly expressed and analyzed by the California Supreme Court
in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court.159 Although discussed in much more detail in Part V.B of this Article, these arguments include the conclusion that a separate cause of action is unnecessary in light of existing remedies;160 the strong policies against
creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct
underlying the law; the uncertainty of establishing harm; and the
adverse indirect effects of such a cause of action, particularly on
normal business practices and the significant practical difficulties
caused in trying a spoliation claim, either jointly or separately from
the underlying claim.
Florida’s District Courts of Appeal, which have recognized a separate cause of action, have generally relied upon the decisions in
Smith v. Superior Court161 and Valcin v. Public Health Trust.162 The
159. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
160. As pointed out in the 2000 Handbook on Discovery Practice published by the Joint
Committee of the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar and Conferences of Circuit and
County Court Judges, “[m]any practitioners are frustrated by the ostensible reluctance of
trial courts to sanction parties for discovery abuse. This reluctance probably stems from
the trial courts’ failure to fully appreciate their broad powers.” JOINT COMM. OF THE TRIAL
LAWYERS SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR AND CONFERENCES OF CIRCUIT AND COUNTY COURT
JUDGES, 2000 HANDBOOK ON DISCOVERY PRACTICE 1 [hereinafter 2000 HANDBOOK]. As further noted in the Handbook, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380(b)(2) specifies the permissible sanctions including:
A. An order that the matters about which the questions were asked or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established;
B. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting that party from introducing certain
matters in evidence;
C. An order striking pleadings or staying further proceedings until the order
is obeyed, or dismissing the action or part of it, or rendering a judgement of default against the disobedient party;
D. In addition to the above, an order treating is contempt of count the failure
to obey; . . .
....
F. [T]he [award of] reasonable expenses . . . which may include attorney’s
fees . . . .
Id. at 3-4.
161. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
162. 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
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validity of such a conceptual framework, however, is extremely questionable. Not only has Smith been overruled, but the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Valcin stopped far short of recognizing a
separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence.
In fact, the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Valcin raises serious questions concerning the constitutional validity of such a new
tort by concluding that the sanctioning of an irrebutable presumption
of negligence, even where the spoliation (failure to keep records) was
intentional, would constitute a violation of the defendant’s right to
due process, as well as an abrogation of the jury’s function.163 In
striking the broader remedy fashioned by the Third District on the
basis that it “sw[ept] wider than necessary,”164 the Florida Supreme
Court also repeatedly stressed the need to strictly limit spoliation
remedies only to the specific action necessary to cure the prejudice
created to avoid these constitutional problems.
In light of the numerous less-burdensome and constitutionally
troubling remedies available to directly address the prejudice caused
in spoliation circumstances, a separate cause of action appears to be
both superfluous and outside the scope of permissible remedies.
Similarly, the recognition of a separate cause of action where the
spoliation is unintentional or merely negligent is also inconsistent
with the well-established law of Florida governing discovery sanctions. Florida courts have repeatedly held that the striking of pleadings or dismissal of a suit with prejudice for noncompliance with a
discovery order are the severest of sanctions, which are only appropriate where the offending party willfully and deliberately fails to
comply with previous discovery orders.165 “Therefore, it is only appropriate to strike a party’s pleadings when that party willfully fails to
comply with discovery orders. Striking pleadings or entering a default also is proper when a party engages in willful misconduct.”166
Even in the criminal law context, where there is a much higher
burden on the state to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for
the defense than upon the parties in a civil suit, the defendant is required to establish bad faith on the part of the law enforcement personnel in discarding such evidence before a denial of due process is
found to exist.167 For example, in Arizona v. Youngblood,168 the

163. Id. at 599.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 718 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 674 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Davis Garden
Estates, Inc. v. Am. Inv. Realty, Inc., 670 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
166. 2000 HANDBOOK, supra note 160, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
167. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); see also Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939
(Fla. 1995); State v. Erwin, 686 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
168. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
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United States Supreme Court rejected claims that a defendant had
been denied due process by the state’s failure to preserve critical semen samples in a rape prosecution, even though the samples might
have exculpated the defendant because the critical issue in the case
had been the identification of the rapist. The Court’s decision was an
outgrowth of its earlier opinion in California v. Trombetta,169 in
which it refused to suppress the results of a breath test upon which a
drunk driving conviction was based, where the police discarded the
test samples before they could be analyzed by the defendant’s expert.
In both cases, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of the
government’s lack of bad faith in discarding the evidence. Although
noting that the government’s good faith or lack thereof was not relevant in cases dealing with the state’s violation of its constitutional
duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the Court concluded
that a different analysis was required where the issue was the failure to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.170 The Court went on to observe that “[p]art of the reason for the difference in treatment is . . .
[that] ‘whenever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently
lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.’”171
Accordingly, the Court held that even negligence on the part of the
police would not be a sufficient ground to base a due process claim
and that instead actual bad faith was required.
B. The Existence of a Duty to Preserve
Regardless of whether a separate cause of action is recognized
or whether spoliation remedies are limited to presently existing
alternatives, the first issue that must be addressed in any analysis is whether a duty exists on the part of the possessor to preserve or maintain the evidence. Without such a duty, there can be
no valid legal basis for the imposition of sanctions, much less the
striking of pleadings or the award of damages. Likewise, without a
clear delineation of the parameters of the duty to preserve evidence, one cannot determine whether they are subjecting themselves to liability by cleaning up a spilled substance on a grocery
store’s floor, moving a damaged car off the road, or disposing of a
broken chair.

169. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
170. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.
171. Id. at 57-58.
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Although it is easy to find such a legal duty where there is a court
order,172 a promise to preserve evidence,173 a statute,174 or administrative regulation175 requiring documents to be maintained, the existence of such a duty is much more difficult to find (and justify) in the
absence of such circumstances. As discussed above, several recent
cases have gone so far as to imply the existence of such a duty by the
mere fact that litigation may some day be filed.176
The Third District has rejected the contention that a common law
duty exists to preserve a defective product, at least in the absence of
actual notification of legal action or a request to maintain the product.177 Courts from other states have also refused to find such a common law duty on a variety of different grounds. In Koplin v. Rosel
Well Perforators, Inc.,178 for example, the Supreme Court of Kansas
observed:
[A]bsent a duty to preserve the [product], appellee is not a wrongdoer and had an absolute right to preserve or destroy its own property as it saw fit. To adopt such a tort and place a duty upon an
employer to preserve all possible physical evidence that might
somehow be utilized in a third party action by an injured employee
would place an intolerable burden upon every employer.179

As a result, the court went on to conclude that “absent some independent tort, contract, agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or
special relationship of the parties,”180 the State of Kansas would not
recognize an independent tort based upon spoliation of evidence.
1. Common Law Duty
The formal filing of a lawsuit provides a clear line of demarcation
for setting such a duty in the absence of an applicable statute, administrative rule, or promise to preserve evidence, because it clearly
places all parties on notice of their need to comply with all applicable

172. See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Menzies, 561 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995);
Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
174. See, e.g., Builder’s Square, Inc. v. Shaw, 755 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (imposing a statutory duty upon employer to preserve evidence critical to employee’s potential
third party claim via worker’s compensation statute).
175. See, e.g., Valcin v. Pub. Health Trust, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
176. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001); St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v.
Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
177. Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998).
178. 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987).
179. Id. at 1181-82.
180. Id. at 1183.
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rules of court, including the duty to preserve evidence.181 In addition,
the filing of a lawsuit also brings attorneys, who can better gauge
what constitutes evidence and its potential role in the upcoming litigation, into the picture. Nevertheless, total reliance upon such a
bright line standard may be too harsh, particularly where there is no
doubt that litigation will in fact result, or if the evidence is absolutely
essential to a fair trial.
There is always a danger of creating too impracticable or meaningless a rule by making it too fact-specific. Such a rule would
require a case-by-case determination of its applicability. However,
a certain amount of flexibility is needed to prevent unfair and unjust results. In this context, reference to the types of circumstances that have been found to give rise to common law duties
under traditional tort law can be useful to determine whether an
analogous duty to preserve evidence is appropriate in the presuit
setting. The most commonly accepted situations in which such a
common law duty would logically be recognized are where: (1)
there is an express request for the evidence actually communicated to the possessor; (2) it is necessary to protect one party from
its reasonable detrimental reliance upon the other; (3) one party is
prevented or thwarted from acting or conducting an attempted investigation by another; (4) a special relationship exists requiring
protection of one party’s interests by the other; or (5) there is a
voluntary assumption of a duty or responsibility by one party to
protect the other’s interests.182
2. Statutory and Administrative Duties
The threshold question in determining the existence of a statutorily created duty to retain evidence is whether such a duty
arises only where the statute in question creates a private cause of
action for its breach. Although this issue was addressed by the
litigants in St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Brinson,183 it was never answered by the Fourth District, which simply ignored the issue in
its opinion.
A statutory tort cause of action, just as a common law one, consists of four elements: (1) a duty, (2) a breach of the duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.184 In determining whether there is a
181. See, e.g., Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Figgie
Int’l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
182. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1992); Smith
v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983); Koplin
734 P.2d 1177.
183. 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
184. See, e.g., Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Fla. Ry.
Co. v. Dorsey, 52 So. 963 (Fla. 1910).
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statutory cause of action, the focus therefore goes beyond the
question of whether there is merely a duty, but also includes the
policy question of whether the law recognizes a private right to enforce a violation of that duty.185
From a logical standpoint, the critical issue in the spoliation
analysis should therefore not focus on whether the statute creates
a private cause of action but whether it creates a duty to preserve
evidence. In fact, where the statutory violation gives rise to a specific cause of action, arguably no additional remedy is necessary.
Reference to statutes to determine the existence or scope of a duty,
even where the statute’s violation does not give rise to private
causes of action, is typical in many other analogous contexts in the
law.
For example, violations of traffic regulations generally constitute evidence of negligence in the operation of motor vehicles.186
Likewise, violations of administrative rules often are found to constitute evidence of negligence in products liability cases.187 Similarly, violation of a bar rule will be considered evidence of legal
malpractice in a civil action,188 even though the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar expressly provide that such a violation will not
give rise to a civil cause of action.189
For such statutes or administrative regulations to give rise to a
duty in the spoliation context, however, they must expressly require the preservation of the evidence in question. As pointed out
in the previous discussion of Brinson,190 neither the federal191 nor
state statutes192 relied upon by the plaintiff created any express
duty upon the hospital to save the purportedly defective anesthesia equipment. At most, these statutes merely required the hospital to report the incident in question to the appropriate authorities. Even in the less demanding context of considering
nonbinding statutes as evidence of negligence, the statutory provisions must at least be relevant and directly applicable to the conduct in question.

185. The guidelines for determining whether a statute gives rise to a private cause of
action are found in the Florida Supreme Court case Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d
983 (Fla. 1994).
186. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CIV) 4.11.
187. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp 714
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (involving FDA regulations); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 490 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
188. Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
189. PREAMBLE, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR.
190. See supra Part III.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b) (2000).
192. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (2001).
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3. Scope of Duty
Closely related to the issue of the existence of a duty to preserve evidence is the corollary question of the extent of this duty.
This question, in turn, is divided into two separate subissues, each
with different considerations.
a. Tangible Evidence.—Once the duty to preserve tangible
evidence is established, the scope of the duty is largely defined by the
evidence’s potential importance to the precise issues raised in the
litigation and the inability to replace the evidence through other
means. Thus, while the loss of a particular product would potentially
have tremendous significance in a products liability action based
upon a defect in its construction, it would have much less importance
in a case based upon defective design.193
This issue was addressed initially in Valcin194 and more recently
in Harrell v. Mayberry.195 In assessing the prejudice caused to the
plaintiff by failing to prepare the operative report required by statute
in Valcin, the supreme court observed that the absence of such a record will not necessarily bear on the issues in all malpractice cases.
Accordingly, the court went on to hold that spoliation remedies will
only be appropriate when necessary to correct the loss of evidence
which is essential to the issues necessary to be proved.
In Harrell, the Second District Court of Appeal was faced with the
loss of relevant evidence, a tripmaster that recorded the truck’s
speed and use of its lights, two central issues in the case.196 Nevertheless, the court still concluded that spoliation remedies were not appropriate because sufficient alternative evidence existed for the
plaintiff to prove its case. The court observed that “[c]ollisions between vehicles without tripmaster devices occur all of the time and
proceed to litigation.”197
Therefore, for spoliation remedies to be applicable, the missing
evidence must be both directly relevant to the issues to be tried and
incapable of replacement through other available evidence.

193. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 833 (Conn. 1996) (discussing
evidence issues in product liability cases).
194. 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
195. 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 745.
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b. Intangible Evidence.—Cases throughout the country have also
extended spoliation of evidence principles to nonphysical “evidence”
as well. For example, an injured bus passenger was allowed to
recover damages where the driver failed to obtain sufficient
identification of the truck colliding with his vehicle so as to deprive
his passengers of their potential claim.198
Although Florida appellate decisions have not yet gone so far, the
Fourth District’s opinion in Brown199 comes very close. The plaintiff,
who was seriously injured in a bicycle accident with a hit-and-run
driver, entrusted his bicycle to the local police department as part of
its criminal investigation into the accident. Although the police department allegedly agreed to preserve the bicycle and return it to the
plaintiff along with all of the other “evidence” that it had collected at
the conclusion of the investigation, everything was discarded.
In upholding the plaintiff’s subsequent spoliation claim against
the police department, the Fourth District concluded that it was not
limited to merely the loss of the plaintiff’s bicycle, but also included
the other evidence collected by the police from sources besides the
plaintiff. Therefore, the court expanded the spoliation claim to include not only the specific property owned by the party, but
nonowned property as well.200
C. The Significance of Intent
Florida’s appellate courts have also disagreed over the significance and importance of the intent of the party in destroying evidence under virtually identical circumstances. An example of the
disparate treatment of this issue is seen by contrasting the First District’s decision in Metropolitan Dade County v. Bermudez201 with the
Third District’s opinions in Figgie International Inc. v. Alderman202
and DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co.203
In Bermudez, the First District reversed the trial judge’s exclusion
of the defendant’s expert in a case based upon an automobile accident. Following the expert’s examination of the vehicle in an effort to
find evidence to support the defendant’s seatbelt defense, the plaintiff requested the opportunity to inspect the vehicle. However, the defendant advised him that it had been previously destroyed. In fact, it
was subsequently determined that the vehicle had still been in exis-

198. De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
199. Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
200. But see Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding no
duty exists to investigate incident to passenger in the absence of an express promise).
201. 648 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
202. 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
203. 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
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tence at the time of the request and was not actually destroyed until
twenty-two months later.
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the First District directed
it to reevaluate its action based upon the following test:
What sanctions are appropriate when a party fails to preserve evidence in its custody depends on the willfulness or bad faith, if any,
of the party responsible for the loss of the evidence, the extent of
prejudice suffered by the other party or parties, and what is required to cure the prejudice.204

Although Alderman involved significantly greater egregious conduct, the Third District concluded, “[d]ocument-production requests
put the parties on notice that documents should be preserved, regardless of the spoliator’s subjective intent.”205 Likewise, in DeLong,
the court expressly took pains to note that the evidence was “inadvertently lost or misplaced.”206
This confusion in Florida has been further exacerbated by the fact
that there has been a lack of internal consistency even among individual district courts of appeal. For example, the Third District followed its earlier Alderman and DeLong opinions with its decision in
Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Igac,207 in which the court refused to require a
spoliation instruction where the plaintiff “lost” a critical CAT scan,
stating “[w]e cannot conclude that this is one of ‘those extremely rare
instances that the evidence establishes an intentional interference
with a party’s access to critical medical records.’” Although not apparent from the court’s brief opinion, the record of the case shows
that the critical CAT scan disappeared three months after the defendant’s request for production, despite the court’s earlier admonition
in Alderman.208
As discussed in more detail in the following subsection analyzing
alternative remedies, there is a conceptual difference between attempting to address the intentional destruction or failure to preserve
evidence as compared to conduct that is merely negligent or innocent.
Where the spoliation does not constitute an intentional attempt to
destroy evidence for the purpose of prejudicing another party, the
remedy to be fashioned should be compensatory in nature rather
than punitive. Where the actions were not taken for the purpose of
gaining an undue or unfair advantage in litigation, the goal should
be merely to place the parties in the same position they would have
204. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d at 200 (emphasis added).
205. 698 So. 2d at 567 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
206. 710 So. 2d at 707.
207. 741 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So.
2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987)), rev. denied, 762 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2000).
208. 698 So. 2d at 564.
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been in had the evidence been preserved. As also subsequently discussed in more detail, there are generally sufficient alternative
remedies—short of recognizing a separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence—that exist to address this type of situation.
On the other hand, where there has been an intent to perpetrate a
fraud or to prejudice a party, punitive action is generally warranted.
In such a case, the goal is not only to remove any disadvantage occurring to the innocent party but also to punish the wrongdoer for his
conduct and to further set an example to deter others from similar
actions.209 Under these circumstances, a separate cause of action is
more warranted as recognized by many states which limit such
claims to intentional spoliation.
D. Degree of Damage or Prejudice
Loose language in several cases has caused a gradual erosion as to
the degree of damage or prejudice that must exist before spoliation
principles will be given effect in Florida. In Valcin and the early Florida spoliation cases, the courts required the plaintiff to establish that
the missing evidence prevented it from establishing even a prima facie case.210 Although most subsequent cases have reasserted this requirement,211 some recent cases, however, have appeared to significantly lower the bar by implying that it is only necessary for the
plaintiff to establish that it was “hindered,”212 “impaired,”213 or “cost
[him] an opportunity to prove [his] lawsuit.”214
In the recent Strasser v. Yalamanchi decision, the court appeared
to be trying to strike a middle ground between these positions by
holding:
Florida law does not require that it be impossible for a party to
prove its case in order to recover damages on a spoliation claim. A
party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may
still be able to prevail in an action for breach of contract on the basis of existing evidence, albeit to a lesser extent and for reduced
damages.215

209. See, e.g., Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
210. Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599-600 (Fla. 1987); see also Hernandez v. Pino, 482 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
211. See, e.g., Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (overturning order striking pleadings where defendant destroyed speed monitor in truck); Sponco Mfg.,
Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1995); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d
313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
212. E.g., King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 4th DCA
1995).
213. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
214. E.g., Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
(citations omitted).
215. 783 So. 2d 1087, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (emphasis added).
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Of course, the Third District reached the nearly opposite conclusion in Herman,216 thereby leaving the status of Florida law on this
precise issue in doubt. Conceptually, the “loss of chance” standard is
inconsistent with Florida tort law in general, as even routine negligence cases typically require proof of causation at least to a “more
likely than not” standard.217 The “hindered” and “impaired” standards are not only virtually devoid of meaning, but would also appear
to require even less proof than a “loss of a chance.”
The most consistent standard consonant with the principles underlying the theory of spoliation cases mandates a return to the
original requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate an inability
to proceed without the missing evidence. Such a standard is required
whether one views spoliation claims in the context of either a tort action218 or one based upon the court’s power to award sanctions.219
As observed by the California Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center,220 tort law generally requires reasonable certainty as
to the existence of damage, especially where there may be some uncertainty as to the amount of the damage. In the absence of requiring
a party to establish its inability to proceed (or defend) without the
missing evidence, the existence of harm becomes too speculative to
justify tort recovery.221
The same result is reached if one approaches spoliation as part of
the court’s power to sanction litigants. Normally sanctions must be
commensurate with the harm—in other words, “the punishment
must fit the crime.” In the absence of irreparable harm, the allowance of a spoliation remedy would therefore exceed compensation and
amount to an unwarranted penalty, particularly in the absence of intentional wrongdoing.223
E. Proof of Causation
Closely related to the issue of the degree of damage or prejudice
necessary to sustain a spoliation of claim is the question of proving

216. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313. In an uninsured arbitration proceeding without the
damaged vehicle, the adverse driver was found 20% at fault. In a subsequent spoliation
suit, aided by various evidentiary presumptions to compensate for the missing vehicle, the
adverse driver was found to be 35% at fault. The appellate court concluded, however, that
the increase of 75% over the original result did not constitute a significant impairment as a
matter of law in vacating the jury’s verdict and finding for the insurer.
217. See, e.g., Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
218. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
219. Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
220. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 513 n.3 (Cal. 1998).
221. Id. at 518-19; see also Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1311.
222. See Harrell, 754 So. 2d at 744.
223. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 518-19.
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causation—in other words, is it necessary for the party raising spoliation to go out and actually lose its case first?
In Bondu, the Third District held that the claim “did not arise until the summary judgment adverse to her [underlying] medical malpractice claims was entered.”224 The court reasoned that until the underlying claim was disposed of adversely to the plaintiff, there were
no legally recognizable damages.
Subsequently in Miller, however, the same court retreated from
its earlier conclusion and relying upon the California decision of
Smith v. Superior Court225 held that “[f]or reasons of judicial economy, and to prevent piecemeal litigation, we see no reason to wait for
a final judgment in the underlying lawsuit before bringing an action
for the derivative claim.”226 The status of Florida law on the issue
was cast even further in doubt when the Third District observed recently that “liability for spoliation does not arise until the underlying
action is completed.”227
From a conceptual standpoint, the speculation over the actual effect of the missing evidence is one of the greatest problems with the
spoliation remedy. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc.:
[I]t is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would have
shown. . . . It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even presuming
that the destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate
what it would have contributed to the plaintiff ’ s success on the
merits of the underlying lawsuit. Given that plaintiff has lost the
lawsuit without the spoliated evidence, it does not follow that he
would have won it with the evidence.228

Where the spoliation claimant is not required to at least go forward without the evidence, the situation exists where there is speculation on top of speculation as to both the outcome and the reasons
for it. Thus, by consolidating both claims for trial purposes there is
speculation as to both the existence and the extent of the injury.
An extremely analogous circumstance from which useful parallels
can be drawn is the legal malpractice cause of action. To prove its
damages where the claim is based upon the attorney’s handling of
litigation matters, the client must prove the so-called “case within a
case.” In other words, the plaintiff must prove that “but for” his at-

224. 473 So. 2d at 1310.
225. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
226. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 28 n.7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
227. Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home Emergency Servs. Inc, 2001 WL 37808, at *1 (Fla. 3d
DCA Jan. 17, 2001) (emphasis added).
228. 456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 1990) (citations omitted).
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torney’s negligence he would have prevailed in the underlying suit.229
Under some circumstances the client must not only lose the underlying suit at trial230 but also on appeal as a condition precedent to establishing his damages with legal sufficiency.231
The rules governing the establishment of damages and causation
in legal malpractice claims form a useful and logical guide for determining these same issues in the spoliation context because of the
strong analogy between the two types of actions. In the legal malpractice case the causation issues generally center around the question of “but for attorney’s negligence, would the client have recovered?” The exact same question applies in the spoliation context, “but
for the missing evidence, would the plaintiff (or defendant) have
prevailed?” It therefore makes sense to utilize a body of law
developed over the years to deal with this issue.
Closely related to the issue of causation is the format to be used
for trying the spoliation claim. Allowing consolidation with the
underlying negligence claim, as in Brinson232 and Miller,233 creates
both practical and conceptual problems.
Initially, the strategy in defending a spoliation claim is often just
the opposite of defending a nonspoliation suit. In the spoliation action, one key defense is generally the argument that there was sufficient evidence to establish liability without the missing evidence. Accordingly, one of the ways to defend a spoliation suit is to therefore
establish the existence of alternative evidence which is still available
to prove the proponent’s case.
By consolidating the claims, however, the defendant will be unfairly placed in the “Catch 22” situation whereby successfully defending the spoliation action, it proves the plaintiff’s liability case. Thus,
where both claims are tried together, the party defending the spoliation claim is faced with the Hobson’s Choice of having to decide
whether to produce evidence (or make arguments) in defense of the
spoliation claim that will assist its opponent in proving its negligence
claim. A variation of this problem was seen in the Brinson case,
where the only way for the defendant hospital to defend the spolia-

229. See, e.g., Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr, 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Kovach
v. Pearce, 427 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1973).
230. See, e.g., Ferrari v. Vining, 744 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (and cases cited
therein).
231. See, e.g., Richards Enters., Inc. v. Swofford, 495 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986);
Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
232. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
233. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
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tion claim was to give up its statutorily created risk management
privilege.234
Another potential problem arising from consolidation is the danger of duplicate damage recoveries, particularly where the missing
evidence only impairs the plaintiff from proving his entire case and
does not render it impossible. In Strasser, the Fourth District observed:
A party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may
still be able to prevail in an action for breach of contract on the basis of existing evidence, albeit to a lesser extent and for reduced
damages. By entitling [plaintiff] to certain evidentiary presumptions, the spoliation claim permits recovery for those missing damages that but for [defendant’s] destruction of evidence [plaintiff]
otherwise would have been able to prove. The total measure of
damages remains the same—namely, the amount of money due
[plaintiff] under the contract. Accordingly, we find no error in
permitting the jury to find for [plaintiff] on both the spoliation and
breach of contract claims or in failing to provide for a separation of
damages for each on the verdict form.235

While it may be relatively easy to prevent a duplication of recovery in the contract setting, particularly where the damages are liquidated, the same cannot be said in those tort cases where the damages
are unliquidated. The California Supreme Court’s recognition of the
problems arising from consolidation was one of the bases for its reversal of the entire Smith line of cases in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center:
[I]f, as plaintiff seeks to do here, a spoliation tort cause of action
were tried jointly with the claims in the underlying action, a significant potential for jury confusion and inconsistency would arise.
The jury in such a case logically would first consider the underlying claims. . . .
In doing so, the jury would consider any acts of spoliation by
applying the evidentiary inference of Evidence Code section 413. If
the jury rejects the spoliation victim’s position on the underlying
claims, it has either rejected application of the evidentiary inference to the case before it (e.g., because the spoliation victim has
not demonstrated that the spoliation was intentional), or has determined that, even applying the inference in favor of the spoliation victim, the other evidence in the case compels a different result. The jury would then consider and decide the spoliation tort
claim; in doing so, however, it would necessarily be reconsidering
its adjudication that either no intentional spoliation occurred or
that the spoliated evidence would not have led to a different result.

234. 685 So. 2d at 34.
235. Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087, 1094-95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
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At the least, this would be confusing to the jury; at most, it would
lead to inconsistent results.236

F. Existence of Other Remedies
Many less drastic remedies exist under both the Florida Rules of
Evidence and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. In Bermudez, the
court concluded that where the party destroying the evidence acts
willfully and maliciously, sanctions “will almost invariably” be warranted, including dismissal of a claim or defense.237 Where the evidence is inadvertently destroyed, however, the court held that “less
drastic measures are ordinarily appropriate.”238 Included within the
realm of such less drastic measures are the exclusion of experts,239
the use of rebuttable presumptions to shift the burden of proof,240 the
use of evidentiary inferences, and jury instructions.241
A good example of the type of curative practices that can be used
is found in the Youngblood242 case where the police had failed to retain semen samples used to identify the defendant in a rape prosecution. To help remedy the potential prejudice caused by the failure to
maintain this potentially important evidence, the lower court instructed the jury that if the state had destroyed or lost evidence, that
it could “infer that the true fact is against the state’s interest,”243
while allowing the defendant to argue that the testing would have
exculpated him.
Consideration must also be given to the appropriate construction
for presumptions designed to compensate for the spoliation of evidence. Some jurisdictions recognize the presumption that “but for the
fact of the spoliation of evidence the plaintiff would have recovered in
the pending or potential litigation.”244 Other courts, however, have
limited the presumption to an inference that “the destroyed evidence
would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it.”245

236. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 520 (Cal. 1998).
237. Metro Dade County v. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
238. Id.
239. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Allister Mfg. Co., 622 So. 2d 1348, 1352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
240. Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
241. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d 197; see also Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.
4th DCA 2001) (concluding that it was appropriate to advise the jury of the defendant’s destruction of the evidence in question as an exception to the general rule that prohibits the
introduction of evidence at trial of pretrial discovery conduct).
242. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
243. Id. at 54.
244. Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000).
245. Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996); see also DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992).
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In circumstances where the destruction or failure to preserve the
evidence is unintentional, this latter approach is clearly much more
consistent with principles underlying spoliation, which are designed
to compensate the party affected by the missing evidence to level the
playing field. In such cases, the inference that the evidence in question would have been adverse to that party does not replace the parties’ need to produce sufficient evidence of the material facts necessary to establish the elements of the specific cause of action, nor does
it shift the burden of proof.246 Thus, in these circumstances, the party
receiving the benefit of the spoliation inference is in no better or
worse situation than they would be if the evidence had been preserved.
The argument that a stronger inference would be appropriate
where the spoliation is intentional is a valid one. Where a party intentionally destroys evidence to secure a litigation advantage, the
calculated nature of its conduct gives rise to the strong inference that
the party itself concluded that the evidence would be so harmful to
its case that it was worth the risk of getting caught to destroy it.
Therefore, a much stronger inference is created by such conduct.
In such cases, a reasonable argument can also be made that it is
necessary not only to place the injured party in the same position it
would have been in absent the loss of the evidence, but also to punish
the wrongdoer.247 The need for such a sanction is not only necessary
to punish the party for its wrongful conduct, but also to act as a deterrent against similar conduct in the future.248
G. Other Factors
1. Due Diligence
While most courts have weighed the diligence of the party seeking
to invoke spoliation remedies as part of their prejudice analysis,249
some courts have treated such diligence as a separate element, that
must be proved as part of the spoliation claim.250 The Connecticut
Supreme Court has gone so far as to require “[i]f the spoliated evidence was necessary for inspection or testing, the party who seeks
the inference must have taken all appropriate means to have the
evidence produced. This may include, if necessary, an attempt to obtain a court-ordered inspection.”251
246. See, e.g., Beers, 675 A.2d at 833; DeLaughter, 601 So. 2d at 822-23.
247. See, e.g., Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., North v. Altech Yachts, Inc., No. 4D01-225, 2002 WL 54512 (Fla. 4th
DCA Jan. 16, 2002); Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
250. See, e.g., Beers, 675 A.2d at 833.
251. Id. (citations omitted).
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2. Control of Evidence at Time of Loss
Evidence which is destroyed must be within the possession or control of the party against which spoliation is asserted. Accordingly, a
claim will not lie against a party where the evidence is disposed of by
an unrelated third party over which it had no control.252
An analogous rationale was followed in Gentry v. Toyota Motor
Corp.,253 where the plaintiff’s expert removed a piece of the plaintiff’s car with a hacksaw as part of his evaluation for purposes of
supporting the plaintiff’s products liability action against the manufacturer. Because the expert had acted without the plaintiff’s knowledge or authorization, the court refused to charge the plaintiff with
responsibility for his actions.
The issue of control also arose in another context in Valcin,254 in
which a hospital was held responsible for a surgeon’s failure to prepare a statutorily required operative report. Although the court
noted that there was generally an independent contractor relationship between doctors and hospitals that would not give rise to the
hospital’s liability for spoliation, where there was an employeremployee relationship the hospital would be held vicariously responsible for the surgeon’s actions.
3. Notice
A number of courts have also wrestled with the issue of the sufficiency of notice of the potential litigation that is necessary to give
rise to a duty to preserve potential evidence. In American Family Insurance Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc.,255 the court concluded that
a single call from the plaintiff to a manufacturer’s local dealer advising it of an accident with its product was not sufficient to place the
manufacturer on notice of the need to immediately investigate the
cause of the accident and to anticipate a potential products liability
suit. Likewise, in Dunham v. Condor Insurance Co.,256 a California
appellate court held that the insurer in a motor vehicle accident had
no duty to preserve an allegedly defective truck part for a subsequent
products liability suit where the plaintiffs had made no request for
its retention.
252. See, e.g., Anesthesiology Critical Care & Pain Mgmt. Consultants v. Kretzer, 802
So. 2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (finding Valcin presumption not applicable to healthcare
provider who is not responsible for maintaining records in question); Aldrich v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 737 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (finding that fault for loss of pathology slides could not be firmly fixed); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 1335
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
253. 471 S.E.2d 485 (Va. 1996).
254. 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
255. 585 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
256. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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Recently, the Supreme Court of Alabama has also has reached a
similar conclusion in Smith v. Atkinson,257 holding:
[A] third party’s constructive notice of a pending or potential action is not sufficient to force upon the third party the duty to preserve evidence. “Limiting the usual duty in third-party negligent
spoliation to an agreement to preserve, or a voluntary undertaking
with reasonable and detrimental reliance, or a specific request,
ensures that such a spoliator has acted wrongfully in a specifically
identified way.”258

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal took a much more expansive view of the type of notice necessary to create such a duty,
however, in Builder’s Square, Inc. v. Shaw,259 which arose from an
employee’s fall from a ladder claimed to be defective. Section 440.39,
Florida Statutes,260 imposes a duty upon an employer to cooperate
with an employee in maintaining a claim against third parties. The
courts have construed this obligation to include the duty to preserve
evidence critical to the suit.261
In this particular case, the employer had notice within three days
after the incident that the employee had been injured on one of the
twelve ladders that had been maintained on the premises. Although
the employer did not have actual notice as to which of the twelve
ladders had been specifically involved in the accident, the court concluded “while actual notice of identified evidence is the clearest form,
an employer can similarly be charged with notice when the circumstances are such that it should have known that certain evidence
could conceivably be critical to an employee’s claim.”262 As a result,
the court concluded that the employer had a duty to consult with its
employee before disposing of any of its ladders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The threshold issue that courts must address is whether a separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence will be recognized.
Some jurisdictions have concluded that a separate cause of action is
appropriate, while others instead have opted to utilize existing alternative remedies. In either circumstance, however, logic would dictate
that the same rules and guidelines should be applicable as a requisite to applying a spoliation remedy, whether it be under the guise of

257. 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000).
258. Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
259. 755 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
260. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (2001).
261. See, e.g., Gen. Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer, 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
3d DCA 1995).
262. Shaw, 755 So. 2d at 724.
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a tort claim or through one of the other alternatives available to
courts.
First and foremost, there must be a duty to preserve or maintain
the evidence. In the absence of such a duty, a party who fails to preserve or which disposes of evidence is not a wrongdoer, because individuals have an absolute right to preserve or destroy their own property as they see fit in the absence of a legal prohibition.263 Such a
duty must be a requisite regardless of whether the remedy under
question is potential liability under tort or merely a sanction in pending litigation. In either case, the parties legal rights are being affected and therefore must be subject to the same due process protections.
Secondly, the precise spoliation remedy permitted should also be
dependent upon the degree of culpability or scienter of the party disposing or failing to preserve the evidence in question. In the absence
of willful and intentional conduct specifically designed to thwart another party’s legal rights or to obtain an improper advantage in legal
proceedings, the guiding principle behind the remedy should be limited to compensating the injured party for the missing evidence so
that it would be in the same position had the evidence been maintained. As such, the victim of an unintentional spoliation is not entitled to being placed in a superior position, nor is the nonmalicious
spoliator subject to a penalty in the form of incurring a greater legal
burden.
Where the spoliator’s actions are intentional or malicious in nature, however, other policy considerations come into play. Under
these circumstances, a much stronger inference arises from such calculated conduct and it is also appropriate to punish the wrongdoer
for its conduct and to seek to deter others from similar actions.
In many ways, focusing the scope of the remedy upon the degree
of intent or scienter of the spoliating party is similar to the conceptual framework underlying the distinctions between compensatory
and punitive damages in tort law. In the tort context, an actor whose
conduct negligently injures another is liable only for compensatory
damages designed to place that individual back in the same position
it would have been in but for the negligent infliction of the injury.
Where, however, a defendant is guilty of intentional, willful or reckless misconduct, punitive damages are allowed to both punish the
wrongdoer and to deter others from similar conduct. This same analogy applies equally to spoliation remedies, whether they be in the
form of a separate cause of action or one of the alternative remedies.

263. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987).
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Third, spoliation remedies should only come into play, particularly
when dealing with unintentional and nonmalicious actions, when
there has been a significant and measurable harm created by the loss
of the evidence. Early cases limited spoliation remedies to those circumstances where the missing evidence literally prevented the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case.264 By its very nature, the effects of spoliation are generally speculative. As observed by the
United States Supreme Court in Youngblood,265 when attempting to
determine the effect of missing evidence, “courts face the treacherous
task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown
and, very often, disputed.” Therefore, regardless of what type of spoliation remedy is under consideration, a high threshold of injury is
important to justify the necessary degree of speculation inherent in
such claims. Once again, however, where the actions of the spoliator
are intentional, a much lower threshold is required.
Finally, in considering spoliation remedies, courts should also require the use of the least drastic alternative, particularly where the
spoliation is unintentional in nature. Discovery and evidentiary rules
generally provide courts with considerable discretion in fashioning
sanctions and remedies for discovery problems and abuses. These
rules are designed to cause the least damage to the parties’ right to
due process and trial by jury. In creating spoliation remedies, courts
should always be cognizant of the parties’ constitutional rights to due
process, trial by jury, and the lawful use of their property.

264. See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987); Hernandez v.
Pino, 482 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
265. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988) (citations omitted).

